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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
JERRY MARCELLIN, ) 
) 
Respondent and Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs.- ) 
) 
DELBERT OSGUTHORPE, ) 
) 
Appellant and Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Case No. 8944 
Respondent accepts the version of the 
facts presented by the Appellant on pages 
1 and 2 of his brief but takes the follow-
ing view of the facts discussed by Appellant 
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2 
on page 3 of his brief. After the· Appel-
lant stopped to aid the driver of the Cad-
illac, he testified that he observed the 
headlights of Plaintiff's automobile ap-
proaching. As soon as he saw the car coming, 
he started to back up (T.67). He was aware 
there was a situation of peril (T.63). He 
continued backing to a point where his right 
wheels were off the blacktop before Plain-
tiff's automobile ricocheted from the rear 
bumper of the Cadillac into the left front 
fender of his truck: (T. 67). The impact 
pushed his truck back another two or three 
feet, and it came to rest with its left 
front at a point 27 feet diagonally across 
the road from the left rear of the Cadillac 
(T.47). The testimony varied as to the 
width of the space between the Cadillac 
and the truck through which Plaintiff might 
have passed, depending upon the observer 
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3 
who testified. Respondent said 8 or 10 ·feet 
(T.l8,19}o Anyway, the jury found that it 
was wide enough so that if the Plaintiff 
had been able to see, he had a clear chance 
to pass through without striking either of 
the vehicleso 
Respondent testified that as he approach-
ed Appellant's truck, be was blinded by its 
lights and he saw the tail light of the Cad-
illac only after he had broken through the 
glare of these lights, a distance of 50 or 
60 feet from the Cadillac (T.7,25}. Ap-
pellant states in his brief that Respond-
ent saw the Cadillac when 250 feet from 
it. This is not our interpretation of the 
testimony. Following a series of rather 
bewildering questions on cross-examination, 
Respondent·stated that his lights when on 
dim illuminated objects 350 feet ahead 
(T.27}. He also said that the first sign 
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4 
he saw of the Cadillac was its tail light 
50 or 60 feet away, which was illuminated 
itselfo Apparently, confused by the manner 
in wbich the question was put, he admitted 
on cross-examination that he first saw 
the Cadillac when his lights struck it. 
Counsel would have the Court infer from 
this that he saw the Cadillac when he was 
350 feet from ito The jury obviously did 
not so conclude, and we submit none of the 
testimony bears this out 0 
Respondent testified that he could 
not have stopped in this short distance 
after he saw the tail lights. Had it not 
been for the b1inding lights, he could have 
turned out and avoided the Cadillac through-
out most of the distance. After Respond-
ent reached a point 200 to 250 feet from 
the Defendant, at which time he concluded 
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5 
that the Defendant would not dim his 
lights, he eased off his accelerator and 
lost perhaps 5 miles an hour of speed. 
When he did see the Cadillac, he was able 
to swerve t~ the left f~r enough so that 
its bumper scraped his car for a depth of 
only two or three inches, and this thrust 
him to the left into th& trucko 
ARGUMENT 
I 
As to Defendant's contention that the 
doctrine of last clear chance should not 
have been submitted to the jury in this 
case: 
As Respondent traveled the last 250 
feet to the point of impact, he was unaware 
of his peril, but throughout part of this 
distance, he was not in an inextricable 
position; that is to say, he could have 
slowed down to 10 or 15 miles per hour, and 
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6 
when he reached the point 50 feet from 
the Cadillac where he first saw it, he 
would have been able to turn out and miss 
it. However, as he prbceeded along through 
this distance, he reached a point where, 
due to the slickness of the road, he could 
no longer slow sufficiently to turn out 
and miss the Cadillac within the 50 feet. 
He had the·n reached a point of inextri-
cable peril as far.as anything he could 
have done for himself was concerned. 
However, for some additional distance, 
it was still possible for the Appellant 
to save Respondent by dimming his lights. 
This is so because throughout this dis-
tance the Respondent, even at the speed 
he was going, could still have swerved to 
the left sufficiently to avoid the Cadillac 
if he could have seen. He finally reached 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
a point where, even if he had been able to 
see, he would still not have been able to 
swerve and avoid the accident. Very short-
ly after this, he saw the red light and 
attempted unsuccessfully to avoid it. The 
jury accepted this analySis of the physical 
facts. 
I call the Court's attention to the 
following two diagrams: 
EFFECT OF THE LIGHTS. 
~;ac X I 
}\ ( ( ?! l 
-------
-------------- -----------
-----=-~---r.,._•:] ___ /1_. --_. ,_. ' . ...... ,i_/_:;, (--.~' _()_i_~_. --_. ?"'_· s_l....,.&:t;;..._# /?_. /_.s_· 
---
·-----Not till Plaintiff breaks through the 
beam of Defendan£•s lights at point x, 50 
feet from the Cadillac, does he see the 
gleam of its tail lightG 
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Position of' Point Last point 
Cadillac whel;"e where Plf. 
Plfo saw at 30± mph 
Cadillac could have 
steered out 
of peril if 
he could have 
seen 
y X c 
50'-60 1 
Last point where 
Plf. could have 
slowed from 35± 
mph to such speed, 
say 10-15 mph, as 
would have permitted 
him to steer out in 
last 50 feet 
B 
Point where 
Plf" con-
cluded Def. 
would not 
dim 
A 
'ex> 
From A to B, Plaintiff is not in inextricable peril but is unaware of 
his danger. 
From B to c, Plaintiff is in inextricable peril, but Defendant can 
still save hime 
After c, nothing can be donee 
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Appellant first claims that the doc-
trine of last clear chance in Utah is based 
largely upon proximate cause and asserts 
that if Plaintiff's negligence continues 
up to the time of the injury and is a prox-
imate cause thereof, last clear chance is 
not applicable. 
I submit this is totally unsound. In 
substantially all of the last clear chance 
cases, the negligence of the Plaintiff con-
tinued up to the time of injurye The Utah 
Court has characterized the doctrine as 
the humanitarian doctrine and stressed the 
fact that in all cases where it applies, 
the negligence of the Plaintiff does con-
tinue to the time of the accidente The 
case of Compton et al. v. Ogden Union Rail-
way and Depot Company (Utah, 1951) 235 P. 
2d 515, cited by the Appellant is simply 
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10 
not in point. When in that case the Court 
uses the words, "the injured person's neg-
ligence has not come to rest," it does not 
mean that the negligence has ceased. What 
it means is that the negligence, either in 
the form of inattent~veness or the form of 
a course of action which has resulted in 
inextricable peril, has fixed the subsequent 
course of events so that the Defendant, 
as a reasonable person, should realize that 
the peril exists, hence the last clear chance. 
The Court in effect says in the Compton case 
that it was not yet apparent to the Defend-
ant that the Plaintiff's negligence would 
continue or persist until she was in a pos-
ition of inextricable peril. This is point-
ed out by the Defendant in his reference 
to the case of Holmgren v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., (Utah, 1948), 198 P. 2d 459. 
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11 
In our case, the Defendant has ad-
mitted knowing that the situation of peril 
had come into being. 
This problem is extensively annotated 
in 92 ALR 47, 119 ALR 1041 and 171 ALR 
365. For purposes of analysis in the notes, 
this class of cases is broken into cate-
gories as follows: 
FIRST CATEGORY: Danger actually dis-
covered by Defendant; injured person phys-
ically unable to escape. 
SECOND CATEGORY: Danger actually dis-
covered by Defendant; injured person phys-
ically able to escape. 
THIRD CATEGORY: Danger not actually 
discovered by Defendant, but ought to have 
been; injured person physically unable to 
escape. 
In our case, the last category would 
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12 
not be involved inasmuch as the Defendant 
testified that he was aware of the peril--
that he saw the Plaintiff was not slowing 
down. 
However, I submit the Plaintiff here 
ran through the first two categories, that 
is, as he approached the scene, he was at 
) 
first in peril because he was unaware of 
the danger but was physically able to slow 
down and escap-e the peril in spite of being 
blinded by the headlights. This was the 
second category listed above. However, 
he reached a point where it was too late 
to slow down enough (due to the slick road 
which precl;uded heavy application of brakes) 
to steer aside with only a 50-foot view of 
the perilG Yet for some distance, he could 
still have turned aside if the lights had 
been dimmed. From that point to the point 
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13 
where there was no opportunity to even 
steer out of peril, he was in category 
number onee This was the basis of sub-
mission of the instruct~on to the jury. 
As a second argument in Appellant's 
first point, Appellant argues in effect 
that even if the Defendant had dimmed his 
lights, it would still be necessary for 
Plaintiff to take a further step, i.e. to 
guide his car between the Cadillac and the 
trucke He claims that this precludes the 
application of the doctrine of last clear 
chance to this casee I feel this point 
can be answered by reference to any of 
the so-called "warning" cases. These are 
numerous and indicate that the doctrine 
is applicable where a warning may cause 
the'Plaintiff to take the necessary action 
to avoid the peril. The Appellant cites 
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certain dictum from the case of Graham v. 
Johnson, et,al., (Utah, 1946), 166 P. 2d 
230, and on re-hearing, 172 P. 2d 665. 
We feel, however, that the case supports 
our positiono In that case, the Plain-
tiff, a 13-year old boy, was playing foot-
ball in the street with two companions. 
This was in violation of the city ordin-
ance. Defendant drove along the street, 
and from the testimony the jury might 
have found that she drove toward the Plain-
tiff. The Court pointed out that she had 
a duty of due care because of the circum-
stance of the presence of the boys in the 
street~ She failed to sound her horn and 
warn the bo,y s of her approach. As she 
approached the boys, one of them called 
a warning to the Plaintiff, whose back 
was toward the driver and he started run-
ning diagonally across the street, and thus 
the collision resulted. It was this fail-
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ure to sound the horn and warn, which was 
relied upon by the Plaintiff as a-basis 
for an application of the last clear chance 
doctrine. In h6lding the doctrine might 
apply, this Court clearly acknowledges that 
an affirmative act by the Plaintiff would 
'be required to remove himself from the 
line of the peril or to avoid getting into 
the line of peril. 
This appears to me to be the same pro• 
blem facing the Plaintiff in the princi-
pal case, although in this case the dim-
ming of the lights, rather than the sound-
ing of the horn, was the step which could 
have been taken to enable him to avert the 
peril toward which he was then directed. 
Besides the Graham case, the case of 
Morley v. Rogers, 252 Pe 2d 231, also deals 
with the situation where the Plaintiff will 
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16 
have to take affir.mative action to save 
himself after warning. Again the Court 
held the doctrine applicable 0 
The last point made by the Appellant 
is that the last clear chance doctrine 
has limited application to cases involv-
ing moving vehicles. In t4e Graham case, 
the Plaintiff was moving. In the Morley 
case' be was riding a bicycle and veered 
out in front of the Defendant. The Court 
held that this did not matter. It said 
that by sounding his horn, the Defendant 
could have caused the Plaintiff to turn 
back to the right and out of the way "and 
avoid the collision." 
In the case of Beckstrom v, Williams, 
3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P, 2d 309, the Court 
also deals with a moving Plaintiff. The 
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Court has this to say: 
"A rule has been expressed in a 
case where two automobiles collided 
that the doctrine of last clear chance 
'is of limited application in the 
case of two moving vehicles.• We 
appreciate that application of the 
doctrine in a case where both ve-
hicles were moving·and rapidly chang-
ing positibns with respect to one 
another is fraught with difficulties. 
There is the unlikelihood that one 
driver would have a clear chance to 
observe the inability of the other 
to avoid a collision and still have 
time and opportunity thereafter to 
avoid it himselfQ We therefore do 
not believe that the extension of 
the application of the 'doctrine in 
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such situations should be encouraged. 
But the reason for the limitation 
of the doctrine as just discussed 
is much less cogent where one ve-
hicle was movi~g very slowly as 
here." 
As the Court points out, the ~octrine 
is not likely to be applicable with two 
rapidly moving vehicles. But that is not 
our case. One is nearly standing still 
and where this happens to be the Defend-
ant, there is just as much room to apply 
the doctrine as where it is the Plaintiff 
who is moving rapidly into a trap set by 
the Defendant. 
II 
It follows that if the doctrine of 
the last clear chance applies in this case, 
the District Court properly entered judg-
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ment for the Plaintiff on the Special Ver-
dict. 
CONCLUSION 
On the fundamental question of whether 
the Defendant had a clear chance to avoid 
the accident, I wish to stress that a 
mere dimming of the lights at the proper 
time would have permitted the Plaintiff 
to have avoided the collision, which oc-
curred with an impact of only about three 
inches depth. The jury apparently felt 
that this was so, and I submit that De-
fendant here had as much chance to avoid 
this accident as any of the Defendants 
did in any of the cases cited hereinabove 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
GLEN M. HATCH 
Attorney for 
Respondent and Plaintiff 
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